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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j).
This is an appeal from a final partial summary judgment
of

the

Third

District

Court

evicting

defendant/appellant

(hereinafter referred to as "Wasatch") from leased premises.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/respondent

("Olympus") objects to Wasatch's

statement of issues on appeal for the reasons stated more fully
below.

Many of the issues presented by Wasatch are not properly

before this court. The only issues on appeal are (1) whether Judge
Wilkinson properly granted Olympus's motion for partial summary
judgment (2) properly found that there was no just reason for delay
and (3) properly certified that judgment as a final judgment.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
Olympus believes to be determinative, is copied and attached hereto
as Exhibit "A".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is an

appeal

from

a partial

evicting Wasatch from leased premises.

5

summary

judgment

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On or about
entered

September

into a written

10, 1984, Olympus

lease agreement

(R.

and Wasatch

6-48)

under

which

Wasatch agreed to lease from Olympus certain real property in the
Olympus

Hills

Shopping

Center

located

Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Utah.

at

4015

South

Wasatch

Wasatch failed to make lease

payments under the lease, and on or about October 12, 1987, Wasatch
executed a promissory note agreement in the amount of $67,197.68,
which
lease.

amount

constituted

R. 194-196.

the delinquent

amount due under

said

A copy of said promissory note is attached

hereto as Exhibit "B".
On

or

about

December

22,

1987,

Wasatch

was

again

delinquent and Olympus filed an unlawful detainer action (original
complaint

in

this

action).

R.

2-49.

Wasatch

complaint and settlement negotiations followed.
the

parties

executed

a

letter

agreement

answered

the

On June 20, 1988,

(Exhibit

"C").

The

validity of the letter agreement is questionable since the parties
were never able to agree whether the percentage rent in paragraph
1 was monthly or annual.

The agreement shows the word

being

changed several times, but no final agreement was reached as to
that wording.
Regardless

of

the wording,

the

agreement were never followed by Wasatch.
6

terms

of

the

letter

Thus, Olympus moved to

amend its complaint (R. 87-92) and the court granted Olympus's
motion to amend on January 6, 1989. R. 95-96. On or about January
29, 19 89, Olympus moved for partial summary judgment to evict
Wasatch.

R. 104-112.

Olympus's motion was supported by an

affidavit stating that Wasatch was in default in payments due under
the lease agreement in the amount of $140,000.00.

R. 110-112 and

Exhibit "G". Wasatch filed no opposing affidavit, and opposed the
motion on legal grounds only.

R. 113-117.

On April 28, 1989, the court granted Olympus's motion to
evict.

R. 151-152.

On June 1, 1989, a Writ of Restitution was

executed and Wasatch was thereafter removed
premises.

from the subject

R. 184-185, 188. On June 7, 1989, the parties appeared

before Judge Daniels (due to Judge Wilkinson's absence) regarding
the question of whether Wasatch's bond would retroactively stay
execution of the already executed writ of restitution.

Judge

Daniels made an order, which was signed on June 15, 1989, wherein
he ruled that, for the convenience of the parties, pending Judge
Wilkinson's return, Wasatch would be allowed to return to the
premises but without prejudice to Olympus's execution of the writ
of restitution.

R. 205-208.

Upon Judge Wilkinson's return, at least two hearings were
held regarding the sufficiency of Wasatch's supersedeas bond.
Wasatch never did comply with Judge Wilkinson's orders regarding
7

the supersedeas bond.

Judge Wilkinson had given defendant until

June 27, 1989 to comply with the court's orders regarding the
supersedeas bond.

Rather than filing the bond, Wasatch

bankruptcy on June 27, 1989.

R. 258.

However, on June 28, 1989,

Judge Clark entered an order lifting the stay.
Exhibit "D".

filed

R. 253-254 and

A second writ of restitution was executed June 29,

1989, and Wasatch was removed from the subject premises a second
time.

R. 251-252.
On July 3, 19 89, the bankruptcy stay was reinstated nunc

pro tunc by Judge Boulden and Wasatch was once again allowed to
return to the premises.

On August 8, 1989, the stay was again

lifted by Judge Clark (Exhibit "E" ) and a third writ of restitution
was executed on August 8, 1989 (R. 271-275), removing Wasatch from
the

premises.

dismissed.

On

August

16, 1989, Wasatch's

bankruptcy

was

Exhibit "F".
DISPOSITION BELOW
On April 28, 1989, Judge Wilkinson entered an order of

partial summary judgment evicting Wasatch from its leased premises
based upon its default under the lease agreement.

Judge Wilkinson

reserved

for a later ruling the question of the amount of the

default.

However, Judge Wilkinson found that there was no just

reason for delay of execution of the eviction order and directed
a final judgment.
8

RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
The only facts upon which Judge Wilkinson based his
ruling are found in the Affidavit of Lauren B. Hunt. Wasatch never
did file a counteraffidavit contesting any of the facts set forth
in the Affidavit of Lauren B. Hunt. A copy of Ms. Hunt's affidavit
is attached hereto as Exhibit "G" for the court's convenience.

The

sworn

was

testimony

is

that, as of January

1,

1988, Wasatch

substantially past due in rental payments due under the lease
agreement, the payments were never brought current, and the default
amount totals, as of January 20, 1989, $147,250.79.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wasatch has no basis whatsoever for this appeal.

First

of all, this is not an unlawful detainer action, but is an action
for breach of lease agreement, requesting eviction, past due rent
and attorney's fees.

The complaint was amended and the original

unlawful detainer complaint is not an issue.
Second, the issue of eviction and the amount of the
default are distinct and separable requests for relief.

Because

Wasatch has admitted through all stages of this action that it was
in substantial default, there was no just reason to delay the
eviction pending the determination of the amount due.

9

Finally,

the

court

below

never

approved

Wasatch's

supersedeas bond because it was an insufficient surety. Therefore,
there never was a stay of the execution of the judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED OLYMPUS'S MOTION TO

AMEND COMPLAINT.
On

or

about

December

22,

1987,

Olympus

filed

its

complaint against Wasatch for unlawful detainer, alleging default
of payment of rent and seeking to evict Wasatch.

For the next

several months, the parties attempted to negotiate a settlement
which culminated in the letter agreement of June 20, 1988, which
was

signed

July

13, 1988.

However, that agreement was

never

properly executed since the parties could not agree as to whether
the percentage rent in paragraph 1 was annual or monthly.
At any rate, even if the agreement was properly executed,
it was immediately breached by Wasatch.

Therefore, as of December

20, 1988, Wasatch was in substantial breach of the original lease,
with or without the amendment.

On that date, Olympus filed its

motion to amend complaint.
The amended
original complaint
in the payment of rent.

complaint

sought the same remedy as the

eviction of Wasatch based upon a default
The amended complaint brought the letter

10

agreement into issue and sought eviction on the basis of breach of
lease rather than unlawful detainer.
Amending

the

complaint

procedure for Olympus to follow.

was

the

obvious

and

proper

All of the issues raised in the

original complaint were as yet unresolved, namely, eviction, amount
of rent due, and payment of penalties, costs and attorney's fees.
When the parties could not reach a settlement and when Wasatch
continued to fail to make the payments due, then Olympus had to
again seek its remedy.

A new action would have been improper since

Olympus was seeking the same relief as in the original action.
At any rate, the court's order allowing Olympus to amend
its complaint certainly caused no prejudice to Wasatch in that no
trial date had ever been scheduled.

The motion was timely for the

same reason and due to the fact that the parties had in good faith
attempted to negotiate a settlement during the one year period that
the case was pending before the amendment.

Therefore, under the

recent Court of Appeals case of Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v.
Reichert, 122 Utah Adv.Rep. 46, 50 (Ct.App. 11-24-89), all of the
factors for the granting of a motion to amend were met.
Many of the arguments in Wasatch's brief focus on the
fact

that

complaint.

the

original

complaint

was

an

unlawful

detainer

However, it is very clear under Utah law that the

original complaint is no longer an issue in this case for any
11

purpose.

In the case of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and

Helpers, Local Union 222 v. Motor Cargo, 530 P.2d 807 (Utah 1974)
the court stated:
The law is overwhelming to the effect that when
an amended complaint, complete in and of
itself, is filed, the former complaint is
functus officio and cannot be used for any
purpose.
Id. at 808.
In this case, an amended complaint was filed and was
complete in and of itself.

Therefore, the original complaint

"cannot be used for any purpose."
Furthermore, in the case of Munden v. Hazelrigg, 105
Wash.2d. 39, 711 P.2d 295 (1985), the Supreme Court of Washington
held that a complaint originally filed as an unlawful detainer
action could be converted to an ordinary civil action.
stated:

Additionally, conversion of an unlawful
detainer action to a civil suit spares the
expense and inconvenience to all parties of
maintaining two suits. . .
We also note that the trial court has inherent
power to fashion the method by which an
unlawful detainer action is converted to an
ordinary civil action. The court may require
amended pleadings to convert the unlawful
detainer to a civil suit.
Id. at 299.
12

The court

Likewise in the case of Thomson v. Reynolds, 174 P. 164
(Utah 1918), the Utah Supreme Court directed that an unlawful
detainer action be remanded and that the District Court permit the
parties to amend and recast their pleadings.

Id., at 167.

Therefore, Olympus's original complaint was properly
amended to a civil action.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT FOR EVICTION.
Olympus has already discussed above the issue of the
letter agreement.

Whether or not it was properly executed, both

it and the original lease agreement were in default at all times
relevant to this proceeding.

Furthermore, whether or not the

letter agreement was properly executed, all of the provisions of
the

main

lease

agreement

continued

in

effect

specifically changed in the letter agreement.

except

those

Contrary to the

allegations of Wasatch in its brief, the letter agreement does not
state that there is no forfeiture clause.

The letter agreement

merely states that the reduced payments will continue for two
years, at the end of which time the regular lease payments will
resume.
Section 24.01 of the lease agreement provides:
In the event of any failure of tenant to pay
any rental due hereunder within ten (10) days
after the same shall be due, . . . then owner
besides other rights and remedies it may have,
13

shall have the immediate right of re-entry and
may remove all persons and property from the
leased premises and such property may be
removed and stored in a public warehouse at the
cost of, and for the account of tenant, all
without service of notice or resort to legal
process and without being guilty of trespass
or becoming liable for any loss or damage which
may be occasioned thereby.
Section 24.02 provides:
Should owner elect to re-enter, as herein
provided, or should it take possession pursuant
to legal proceedings or pursuant to any notice
provided for by law, it may either terminate
this lease or it may from time to time without
terminating this lease . . . relet said
premises . . .
In response to Olympus's motion for summary judgment,
Judge

Wilkinson

terminated

the

lease

and

ordered

a

writ

of

restitution, restoring Olympus to possession of the leased premises
and evicting Wasatch.

In addition, Judge Clark has found in a

final order, from which no appeal was ever taken, that the lease
was forfeited.

See Exhibit "E".

Therefore, Wasatch's several claims that there was no
forfeiture provision or any other remedy available to Olympus Hills
for restitution of the premises fails.
evicted Wasatch for failure to pay rent.

14

Judge Wilkinson properly

III.

WASATCH'S ALLEGATION THAT RENT PAYMENTS FOR APRIL

AND MAY OF 1989 WERE MADE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT; AT ANY
RATE, OLYMPUS DENIES THAT SUCH PAYMENTS WERE MADE.
Wasatch alleges in Section 7 of its brief that Olympus
accepted rent and waived its right to restitution.

These factual

allegations are not in the record before this court and were never
made a part of the ruling below from which the appeal was taken.
Furthermore, Olympus denies having ever received payment
of rent for April and May of 1989.

Wasatch did promise that it

would bring all rent payments current soon after the court's order
in April of 1989.

Wasatch occasionally made payments toward old

obligations to Olympus.
its lease payments.

However, Wasatch never became current in

Although Wasatch makes that allegation in its

brief, it was never made in the court below and is not properly
before this court.
IV.

THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPERLY CERTIFIED

AS A FINAL ORDER.
Wasatch

contends

that

the

trial

court

improperly

certified the partial summary judgment motion for eviction as a
final judgment.

Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to
fewer than all the claims "where more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action . . . "

Rule 54(b).
15

In this case, there are

three claims for relief. The prayer in Olympus's amended complaint
reads:
Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant
as follows:
1. For the issuance of a writ of restitution to
restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff and
to evict the defendant.
2.
For past due rent and other charges accruing
under the lease as amended in the total amount of
$140,990.54.
3.

For reasonable attorney's fees.

4. For such other damages as may be allowed under
the lease agreement as amended or under law as may be
more specifically proved at the time of trial hereon or
at a later date.
5. For costs of suit incurred herein, interest and
such other further relief as the court may deem proper.
Therefore, this is clearly a case "where more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action".
The court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
fewer than all the claims when it expressly determines that "there
is no just reason for delay."

Rule 54(b).

The court made that

express determination in this case, obviously for several reasons.
Wasatch did not dispute that it was in substantial default. There
was

no

reason

to

allow

Wasatch

to

remain

on

the

premises,

essentially rent free, while Wasatch forced the parties to go to
trial over the issues of the amount due, when payments were made,
whether payments were intended to be applied to the promissory note
16

or to the lease, whether bad checks had been paid back, etc.

All

of those issues were reserved for a later trial.
In the meantime, Wasatch offered no reason whatsoever why
there was a just reason for delay.

Even on appeal, Wasatch has

offered no just reason why Olympus should have been forced to have
Wasatch occupy the premises rent free, after a finding by the court
that Wasatch was in substantial default.

No finding at trial over

the amount due ever could have had an impact on the distinct and
separate finding by the court that Olympus was entitled to recover
possession.

That was a distinct, separate claim for relief.

In the case of Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 692 P.2d
765 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court quoted from the United
States Supreme Court as follows:
But the District Court may, by the exercise of its
discretion
in
the
interest
of
sound
judicial
administration, release for appeal final decisions upon
one or more, but less than all, claims in multiple claims
actions.
The timing of such a release is, with good
reason, vested by the rule primarily in the discretion
of the District Court as the one most likely to be
familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons
for delay. [Emphasis in original].
Id. at 768.
Furthermore,

in

the

case

of Allen

Steel

Company

v.

Crossroads Plaza Associates, 119 Utah Adv.Rep. 6 (Sup.Ct. 10-689), the Utah Supreme Court held that a claim for attorney's fees
is uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at
17

trial and that a final judgment can be awarded, with the question
of the attorney's fees award reserved for a later hearing.

Ld. at

9-10.
Therefore, the trial court, in its discretion, properly
certified

the

judgment

as to possession

as a

final

judgment,

subject to immediate execution, since there was no just reason for
delay of execution of that judgment.

If this court determines

that, due to the remaining claims for rent and attorneys fees, the
eviction

judgment was not a final judgment for the purpose of

executing the judgment, Olympus is willing to waive its claim to
the rent due.
However,

That would necessarily result in a final judgment.

Olympus

will

not

waive

that

claim

under

any

other

circumstances.
V. WASATCH FAILED TO POST A SUFFICIENT SUPERSEDEAS BOND.
In at least two hearings, Wasatch failed to satisfy the
court's order regarding the posting of a supersedeas bond.
62(d) of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

provides

appellant may file a supersedeas bond to obtain a stay.
that rule

further provides:

Rule

that

an

However,

"The stay is effective when

the

supersedeas bond is approved by the court."
In this case, the court never did approve the sufficiency
of the proposed bond.

When Wasatch proposed to pledge the assets

of its sister company, Rancho Lanes, as security for Olympus's
18

judgment in this action, and when Olympus objected to that bond
under Rule 62(i) as simply posting one financially troubled bowling
alley for another, both Judge Daniels and Judge Wilkinson required
a second surety in order to offer sufficient protection to Olympus.
Wasatch failed to ever post a second sufficient surety.

The trial

court gave Wasatch more than sufficient time and opportunity to
post such a bond, but Wasatch was either unable or unwilling to do
so.
Therefore, the trial court properly ruled that there was
not sufficient surety for a supersedeas bond.
VI.

THE ISSUES RAISED IN WASATCH'S APPEAL HAVE BECOME

MOOT: THE LEASE HAS ALREADY BEEN DECLARED TERMINATED.
On August 8, 19 89, Judge Glen E. Clark of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah entered an order
granting Olympus relief from the automatic stay, allowing Olympus
to pursue its state law remedies with respect to the premises which
are the subject matter of this action.

In that order, the court

found:
The prepetition eviction of the debtor [Wasatch] pursuant
to the Writ of Restitution terminated the lease, leaving
nothing for the debtor to assume or assign on the
petition date.
Wasatch never appealed this order of the Bankruptcy Court
finding a termination of the lease agreement.

Therefore, Wasatch

cannot now dispute the fact that the lease has been terminated.
19

Accordingly,
premises.

Wasatch

has

no

rights

whatsoever

in

the

subject

Even if the court were to reverse the decision of the

trial court, Wasatch would be unable to return to possession of
the premises, it having no interest in the premises.

Further, once

Judge Clark determined that the lease had been terminated, Olympus
leased the premises to a new tenant, who now has possession of the
premises under a new leasehold agreement.
VII.

OLYMPUS IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED

IN THIS APPEAL.
Pursuant to Rules 33(a) and 40(a) of the Rules of this
court, and under the case of O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P. 2d 306 (Utah
Ct.App. 1987), attorney's fees can be awarded if an appeal has no
basis in law or fact.

In this case, the lease has been forfeited,

and Wasatch has admitted from the very beginning that it was in
substantial default under the lease agreement.
terms

of

the

lease

agreement, Olympus

Pursuant to the

is entitled

to

recover

possession of the premises upon Wasatch's default. Having admitted
being in default under the terms of the lease, Wasatch has no
position to complain about being evicted, either in the trial court
or on appeal.

This appeal has no valid basis in law or in fact,

and is brought solely for the purpose of harassing Olympus.
This appeal culminates Wasatch's long series of delay
tactics, made up of breached agreements, an overdue promissory
20

note,

bad

checks,

frivolous

opposition

to

Olympus's

eviction

action, improper supersedeas bonds and an eleventh hour bankruptcy.
All of these tactics forced Olympus to evict Wasatch three separate
times.

These circumstances, followed by this meritless appeal,

certainly entitle Olympus to an award of its attorneys fees.

The

history of the case is similar to Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 365
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), where fees were awarded as a result of
successive petitions to modify the divorce decree.
Therefore, Olympus is entitled to recover its attorney's
fees incurred in defending this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the

judgment of the trial court should be

affirmed and Olympus should be awarded its attorney's fees incurred
in responding to this appeal.
DATED this

1 / day of January, 1990.
KESLER & RUST

SC0'TO? 0 . MERCER

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

four
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailedj* true and
correct copjve4bf the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT in Docket No.
890598-CA, postage prepaid, this

If

day of January, 1990, to:

Mitchell R. Barker
Ronald C. Barker
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115

ipfawA

librief.was
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Exhibits

Exhibit A

477

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence
for a court sitting without a jury,
(d) Proceedings.
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a
copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt
thereof unless the order of reference otherwise
provides, the. master shall forthwith set a time
and place for the first meeting of the parties or
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after
the date of the order of reference and shall notify
the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence.
Either party, on notice to the parties and master,
may apply to the court for an order requiring the
master to speed the proceedings and to make his
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and
place appointed, the master may proceed ex parte
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a
future day, giving notice to the absent party of
the adjournment.
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the
attendance of witnesses before the master by the
issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be punished as for a contempt and be subjected to the
consequences, penalties, and remedies provided
in Rules 37 and 45.
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of
accounting are in issue before the master, he
may prescribe the form in which the accounts
shall be submitted and in any proper case may
require or receive in evidence a statement by a
certified public accountant who is called as a witness. Upon objection of a party to any of the
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the
form of statement is insufficient, the master may
require a different form of statement to be furnished, or the accounts or specific items thereof
to be proved by oral examination of the accounting parties or upon written interrogatories or in
such other manner as he directs.
i) Report
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall
prepare a report upon the matters submitted to
him by the order of reference and, if required to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he
shall set them forth in the report. He shall file
the report with the clerk of the court and in an
action to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise directed by the order of reference, shall file
with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the
evidence and the original exhibits. The clerk
shall forthwith mail to all parties notice of the
filing.
(2) fn non-jury actions. In an action to be
tried without a jury the court shall accept the
master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
Within 10 days after being served with notice of
the filing of the report any party may serve written objections thereto upon the other parties. Application to the court for action upon the report
and upon objections thereto shall be by motion
and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The
court after hearing may adopt the report or may
modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or
may receive further evidence or may recommit it
with instructions.
(3) In jury actions. In an action to be tried by
a jury the master shall not be directed to report
the evidence. His findings upon the issues sub-
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mitted to him are admissible as evidence of the
matters found and may be read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections
in point of law which may be made to the report.
(4) Stipulation as to findings. The effect of a
master's report is the same whether or not the
parties have consented to the reference; but,
when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law
arising upon the report shall thereafter be considered.
(5) Draft report Before filing his report a
master may submit a draft thereof to counsel for
all parties for the purpose of receiving their suggestions.
(0 Objections to appointment of master. A
party may object to the appointment of any person as
a master on the same grounds as a party may challenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial
of a civil action. Such objections must be heard and
disposed of by the court in the same manner as a
motion.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
PART VH.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these
rules includes a decree and any order from which an
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of
prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against
whom a judgment is entered by default, every
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when
the justice of the case requires it, determine the
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in
the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express
provision therefor is made either in a statute of
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed
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PROMISSORY NOTE AGREEMENT
WHERKAS, on September 10, 1984, Wasatch Bowling, Inc.,
entered into a certain lease agreement with Olympus Hills
Shopping Center, Ltd., owner, under which Wasatch Bowling as
tenant, agreed to lease from OLympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd.,
approximately 22,000 square feet of real property in the Olympus
Hills Shopping Center located at 4015 South Wasatch Boulevard,
Salt Lake City, Utah; and
WHEREAS, Wasatch Bowling, Inc., is substantially in default
in the payment of payments due, including rent, under the terms
and conditions of said lease agreement; and
WHEREAS, Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., has certain
rights and remedies against Wasatch Bowling, including, but net
limited to, legal action to evict Wasatch Bowling and/or for all
amounts due and all attorney's fees and costs; and
WHEREAS, Wasatch Bowling, Inc. contemplates certain
refinancing arrangements for its business operations and agrees
and warrants it will use its best efforts and all due diligence
to complete such refinancing and upon the successful completion
of the same, will immediately pay the obligation represented
hereby in full, notwithstanding any other terms and conditions
herein; and
WHEREAS, Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., is willing to
forebear its rights to proceed immediately against Wasatch
Bowling, Inc., upon certain terms and conditions and if and only
if the obligations contained herein are guaranteed personally by
Wesley F. Sine;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of such forebearance and
other good and valuable consideration receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, Wasatch Bowling, Inc., promises to pay to Olympus
Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., at Salt Lake City, Utah, or at such
other place as the holder hereof shall designate in writing the
sum of Sixty-Nine Thousand Four Hundred and Eighty-Three Dollars
and no/lOOths ($69,483.00) in 24 successive monthly installments of
$1,200.00 each due on the same day of each month, commencing
October J, 1987, and continuing for a period of 23 months and
one final payment of the full unpaid balance remaining due
hereunder, which payment shall be due within thirty days of the
due date of the last monthly installment hereinabove set forth.
Wasatch Bowling shall also pay the Olympus Hills Shopping
Center, Ltd. with the first installment due October 1, 1987, ar\
additional sum equal to the legal fees and costs incurred by
Olympus Hills in the preparation and execution of this Promissory
Note Agreement and the Guarantees incident thereto. Olympus
Hills shaLl notify Wasatch Bowling the amount of such additional
payment due, at lease five (5) days prior to October 1, 1987.

Wasatch Bowling shall provide to Olympus Hills a current
financial statement at the time of executing this agreement and
at the end of every nine (9) month period in the event payment is
not made as agreed or this agreement is extended or renewed.
This obligation shall bear interest at the rate of thirteen
percent per annum, 13% ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE.
If any installment is not paid in full within ten days after
its due date, a late charge may be assessed of $100.00 dollars,
or at holder's election, an amount equal to the annual percentage
rate stated above times the unpaid amount of the installment from
the due date of the installment until paid in full.
If default be made in payment in whole or in part of any
installment at the time wh en or the place where the same becomes
due and payable as aforesa id, and su ch default is not cured
within ten (10) days from the date o f written notice of default,
then the entire unpaid bal ance shall , at the election of the
holder hereof-and without notice of said election, at once become
due and payable. In the e vent of su ch default or acceleration,
the undersigned agrees to pay to the holder hereof reasonable
attorneys' fees, legal exp enses and lawful collection costs, in
addition to all other sums due hereu nder, whether or not suit is
actually filed. Any balan ce unpaid on maturity of this note
shall bear interest therea fter, both before and after judgment,
at the annual percentage r ate stated above.
Presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and
extension of time without notice are hereby waived and the
undersigned consents to the release of any security, or any part
thereof, with or without substitution.
DATED this J^g"

day of September, 1987.
WASATCH BOWLING, INC.
By:.
Title:

— ~,7

--'-A

'/

UmmJjdL

Corporate Secretary
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY. OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
1987.
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing In:

day of September,

GUARANTY AGREEMENT
In consideration and in order to induce Olympus Hills
Shopping Center, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, to accept that
certain Promissory Note Agreement dated September" /,;< , 1987,
entered into by Wasatch Bowling, Inc., a Utah corporation, as a
maker, (the "Note") a copy of said Note being attached hereto and
made a part hereof, the undersigned Wesley F. Sine, an
individual, does hereby unconditionally and absolutely guarantee
the full, faithful and prompt performance, payment and discharge
by the maker of all of the terms and obligations of said Note in
accordance with the terrps thereof and, in the event of default by
the maker in the payment of any amounts payable under said
agreement, the undersigned, upon demand, immediately will pay the
total outstanding unpaid principal balance plus any accrued
interest and costs due under the terms of said agreement, without
requiring any proceedings to be taken by Olympus Hills Shopping
Center, Ltd., against the maker.
The liability of the undersigned hereunder shall not be
modified in any manner whatsoever by any extension that may be
granted to the maker by any court or any proceedings under the
Bankruptcy Act, or any amendments thereof, or under any state or
federal statute. Undersigned expressly waives the benefits of
any such extension. Undersigned agrees to pay all costs of
collection including reasonable attorneys' fees, whether or not
suit is actually filed.
The undersigned shall provide to Olympus Hills a current
financial statement at the time of executing this Guaranty and at
the end of every nine (9) month period thereafter, in the event
payment is not made as agreed or this Guaranty is extended or
renewed.
Undersigned hereby waives notice of the acceptance of this
Guaranty and waives presentment, protest and demand and notice of
protest and demand of said note. Olympus Hills Shopping Center,
Ltd., may without the consent of undersigned__and without giving
notice hereof to undersigned, compound, compromise and adjust its
claim against the maker and grant extensions and other
indulgences, to the maker without affecting the obligations of
the undersigned hereunder. The obligations of undersigned shall
be unconditional and unqualified and shall continue until the
said note is fully paid, satisfied and discharged. This Guaranty
shall not be discharged or affected by the death of the
undersigned, but shall bind his heirs and personal
representatives and shall inure to the benefit of the successors
and assigns of Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd.

this

IN WITNESS WHEgEQJT, jundersigned has h e r e u n t o s e t h i s hand
/ ^ % d a y of September, 1987.
/ V

/ , >>, 'J

(

--^l o

Wesley F. Siner, an i n d i v i d u a l
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

1987.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing In:
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

DEO 10

day of September,
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June 20, 1988

Mr. Wesley Sine
WASATCH BOWLING
640 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
LETTER OF AGREEMENT
Dear Mr- Sine:
Pursuant to the letter dated 3/31/88 from David R. Kocherhans, Property Manager
for Coldwell Banker Real Estate Management Services, pertaining to reduction in
rent the following is what Richard Skankey has agreed to:

*

1)

Monthly rent shall be reduced to $4,000.00 versus 10% of the «>wUy
gross receipts whichever is greater beginning April 1, 1988.
^°^lG>bR

2)

Monthly rent shall include all CAM charges which are approximately
$2,500,00 per month,

3)

Merchants dues will remain at $150.00 per month.

4)

Monthly payment on the Pianissory Note dated October 12, 1987 shall be
reduced from $1,200.00 per month to 5580.00 per month, interest only.

This agreement will extend for the period of two years to March 31, 1990 at the
end of which time the regular lease payments will resume and at this time also
the full amount of the Promissory Note will be due and payable.

-0-37
Richard Skankey / Date
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JUN2 71989
OF^OE OF JUDGE
•3LCM i . CLARK

JOSEPH C. RUST (2835)
SCOTT 0. MERCER (3834)
KESLER & RUST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-9333

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH,
CENTRAL DIVISION

Bankruptcy No. 89C 03881
(Chapter

In re:
WASATCH BOWLING, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Debtor,
Debtor's Tax Identification
No. 87 0257646

ORDER

The motion of Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Limited
("Creditor") for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §362(f) came on for hearing before the above entitled
court on June 27, 1989 at the hour of 3:45 p.m.

Creditor was

represented by and through its counsel, Scott 0. Mercer of Kesler
& Rust.

Debtor appeared through Keith Henderson.

Mr. Mercer

discussed his efforts to notify counsel of the hearing as
required by Rule 4001(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Rules.
The court, having reviewed the verified motion for
-1-

relief from the automatic stay, and having found on the sole
basis that Creditor will suffer irreparable and immediate injury,
loss or damage if it is unable to complete the ordered eviction
of debtor from the leased premises and proceed to place its new
proposed tenant in possession forthwith; and the court having
found that such damage is irreparable in that Creditor has been
unable to find any other suitable tenant for this unique
property; and the court having found that adequate effort was
made to notify counsel for the debtor; it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the automatic stay
be and is hereby modified to allow Creditor to complete its state
court action and executed writ of restitution restoring Creditor
to possession of the leased premises located at 4015 South
Wasatch Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Utah.
DATED this

^

^day of June, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

norable Jtidf^Glen E. Clark

> nsrory
to a :;U:;

<;/ M^.t th? annexed ^r.o iongoing
'A- ..-;:v:;n£ en
^0'

JBcbU£/._A/a<u/-s

-2-
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

Bankruptcy Case No. 89C-03881

In re
WASATCH BOWLING, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Debtor.

ORDER

The matter presently and properly before the court is creditor Olympus Hills
Shopping Center, Ltd.'s Motion to Require Debtor to Assume or Reject Lease, filed on
July 6, 1989.

The lease which is the subject of Olympus Hills' motion concerns

premises known as the Wasatch Bowling Lanes, located at the Olympus Hills Shopping
Center. A hearing was held on July 25, 1989. J. Keith Henderson appeared on behalf
of Wasatch Bowling, Inc., the debtor in this Chapter 11 case.

Scott 0. Mercer

appeared on behalf of Olympus Hills, the landlord. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court ordered counsel to brief within ten days the issue of whether the lease was
in effect when the petition was filed in this case or had terminated prior to that time.
Counsel have timely submitted memoranda on this issue, and the court has carefully
considered and reviewed the arguments of counsel and all memoranda. The court has
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also made an independent review of the pertinent authorities. Now being fully advised,
the court finds and determines as follows:
1.

Judge Scott Daniels' Order of June 15, 1989, restoring the debtor to

possession of the premises, was without prejudice to the rights of Olympus Hills.
2.

Prior to Judge Daniels' Order, Olympus Hills had evicted the debtor from

the premises pursuant to the service of a writ of restitution.
3.

But for Judge Daniels' Order, the debtor would not have been in

possession of the premises on the date of petition and would have had no right to
possession.
4.

The prepetition eviction of the debtor pursuant to the writ of restitution

terminated the lease, leaving nothing for the debtor to assume or assign on the petition
date.
5.

Even if the lease had not terminated, debtor's possessory interest under

the lease had terminated. Thus, the only portions of the lease that the debtor had a
right to assume or assign on the date of petition were the burdens, e.g., payment of
the lease obligation.
6.

It is unreasonable to allow the debtor to assume or assign the burdens

of the lease without the corresponding benefit of possession. The lease is therefore
deemed rejected.
Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that creditor Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., is
granted relief from the stay to pursue its state-law remedies with respect to the
premises known as the Wasatch Bowling Lanes.

DATED this

6
<?

day of August, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

GLEN E. CLARK, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Page 4
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Order to the
following this y
day of August, 1989.

Scott 0. Mercer, Esq.
KESLER & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

J. Keith Henderson, Esq.
8 East Broadway, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Lawrence E. Corbridge, Esq.
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Secretary to "Judge Clark/
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

IN RE

)

WASATCH BOWLING, INC.

5

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

)

Bankruptcy No.

89C-03881

)

The above debtor(s) not having timely filed statement of
affairs and schedules in the above case, it is new upon good cause,
ORDERED, that the above case be and it is dismissed without
prejudice.

DATED: August 16, 1989

United States Bankruptcy Judge
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JOSEPH C. RUST (2835)
SCOTT 0. MERCER (3834)
KESLER & RUST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-9333
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER,
LIMITED, a Utah limited
partnership,
Plaintiff,

:
: AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREN B. HUNT
:

v.

:
:

WASATCH BOWLING, INC., a Utah
corporation,

: CIVIL NO. C87-8427
: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.

:

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Lauren B. Hunt, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the Property Manager of Coldwell Banker Real

Estate Management Services.
2.

I am over the age of 21 years and have personal

knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
3.

Coldwell Banker Real Estate Management Services is the

property manager for Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd.

I am

personally familiar with the lease agreement between plaintiff
-1-

and defendant in this action.
4.

I am personally familiar with all of the payments made

by defendant under the said lease agreement and am personally
familiar with the business records relating thereto.
5.

As of January 1, 1988, defendant was substantially past

due in rental payments due under the lease agreement.
6.

From January 1, 1988 to the present, defendant has

never brought the rental payments current.
7.

From January 1, 1988 to the present, no rental payment

has been paid within ten (10) days of the due date.
8.

Defendant is currently past due in rental payments in

the amount of $147,250.79.
DATED thii£3^J T

day of January, 1989.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
day of January, 1989 by Lauren B. Hunt, the Property

-2-

Manager for Coldwell Banker Real Estate Management Services.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this ?0 ^^day of January,
1989.

(Seal)
Residing at

My^Conariiss i o n Empires:
/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Lauren B. Hunt in
Civil No. C-87-8427, postage prepaid, this ff/pW^day

of January,

1989, to:
Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692

i///ur cg^r^
1:afflauren.sine
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